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From Cobblestones to Pavement:




The U.S. legal system largely divides organizations into two categories:
for-profit and nonprofit. Those wanting to operate between these categories
have had to cobble together business solutions, mixing and matching sub-
sidiaries, joint ventures, and partnerships. Recently, though, organizations
from both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors have made new efforts to
converge upon middle ground. These organizations, called "hybrid" organi-
zations,' blend nonprofit and business values, but they are no longer mixing
and matching subsidiaries, joint ventures, and partnerships. Rather, they are
whole organizations that are operating on the cusp of the for-profit and
nonprofit categories.2
Google's new venture, "Google.org," provides a salient example.
Google.org acts like a nonprofit foundation by making grants to organiza-
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1. See, e.g., Press Release, Nonprofit Sector Research Fund, Nonprofit Sector
Research Fund Supports Study of "Hybrid" Organizations Seeking Social
Change and Economic Change (Apr. 22, 2004), available at
www.nonprofitresearch.org/newsletter'525/newsletter-show.htm?doc-id=22 4
494.
2. In the past year alone, the New York Times has noted this trend toward hy-
bridization three times. See David Haskell, The Sixth Annual Year in Ideas;
For-Profit Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. io, 2006, § 6 (Magazine) at 50;
Stephanie Strom, Make Money, Save the World, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, at
Ci; Stephanie Strom, What's Wrong with Profit?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at
Fi.
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tions in order to address social problems such as climate change.' Yet
Google.org is legally classified as for-profit. This status allows it to do several
things that traditional nonprofits cannot do, such as raise equity capital,
fund start-up companies, and grant money to individuals.
Conversely, some nonprofits have begun to act like for-profits. Al-
trushare Securities, for example, is a brokerage firm that buys and sells
stock, yet it is actually majority-owned by a nonprofit and is guided by the
mission of promoting growth and development in struggling communities.4
The recent flurry of hybrid activity has led commentators to propose re-
forms that foster hybrid organizations.' None of these commentators,
though, has paused to articulate what benefits hybrid organizations provide
and, therefore, whether and why they should be encouraged at all. This
Comment begins to fill that gap. It argues that hybridization would allow
both nonprofit and for-profit organizations to work more effectively to
achieve their social aims. Nonprofits are often constrained by a lack of capi-
tal. For-profits are often constrained by legal duties to maximize profit and
not social outcomes. Hybrid organizations would address both of these
constraints by allowing mission-driven nonprofits to access capital more
readily and by allowing for-profits to commit themselves to achieving social
goals.6
Concluding that there are compelling reasons to promote hybrid activ-
ity, this Comment then summarizes and assesses various reform proposals.
Some have suggested creating new corporate forms. Some have proposed
revamping tax laws. Some have argued for working within the existing cor-
porate law to explore hybrids' potential. This Comment assesses the propos-
als offered to date and charts a way forward. Ultimately, this Comment ar-
gues that organizations can and should continue to explore hybrid activity
while working within the existing laws.
3. Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google's Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2006, at Ai.
4. Altrushare Securities, History and Mission, http://www.altrushare.com/apps/
altrushare/as history-and-mission.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2007).
5. See, e.g., THOMAS J. BILLITTERI, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, NONPROFIT SECTOR
RESEARCH FUND, MIXING MISSION AND BUSINESS: DOES SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
NEED A NEW LEGAL APPROACH (2007), www.nonprofitresearch.org/usr-doc/
NewLegalFormsReport_FINAL.pdf.
6. If these organizations face fewer structural constraints on pursuit of social
goals, the ultimate beneficiaries of these organizations-e.g., the environ-
ment, individuals in need of social services, etc.-will benefit. This Comment
does not discuss in detail how hybrid organizations will better serve those
beneficiaries. It focuses instead on how to overcome the structural constraints
on organizations.
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I. AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR HYBRID ACTIVITY
The discussion about legal reform to foster hybrid activity has not fo-
cused on the question of why more hybrid activity would be good. By briefly
outlining affirmative arguments for hybrid activity from both the for-profit
and the nonprofit perspectives, this Part tries to bring greater clarity to-or
at least to provoke further discussion of-this preliminary issue of why we
want hybrid organizations. Each section describes problems that result from
the binary classification of organizations and outlines the argument for how
a new hybrid structure can help overcome these problems.
A. From the Nonprofits' Perspective
There are two broad categories of nonprofit organizations: service or-
ganizations, which spend money in support of social goals, and grant-
making foundations, which raise money and distribute it to service organi-
zations. The law treats these two types of nonprofits differently, and each
type faces different obstacles when attempting to engage in hybrid activity.
Whereas service organizations worry most about regulations governing how
they can get money, foundations worry most about regulations governing
how they can spend money.
The overarching problem service organizations confront in the current
binary system-in which social organizations are forced into one of two
legal categories, for-profit and nonprofit-is one of access to capital. This
problem manifests itself in a number of ways. First, these nonprofits must
generate their own revenue in the face of manifold legal restrictions on
profit-making activity. Historical developments have created pressure for
nonprofits to generate their own revenue. Starting with President Reagan,
the government has shifted more responsibility to nonprofits for providing
social services, while at the same time reducing nonprofit funding.7 To keep
their doors open, nonprofits learned to find money elsewhere, including
generating it themselves. Then, during the rise of internet entrepreneurship
in the 199os, general enthusiasm for innovative business methods reached a
fever pitch. In this environment nonprofit managers wanted to be seen as
7. LESTER M. SALAMON & ALAN J. ABRAMSON, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 3 (1982). William Foster and Gail Fine suggest that the
data tell a different story, but they do not entirely negate this point because
they do not specify whether government funding has kept pace with the in-
creased demands government has been placing on nonprofits. William Foster
& Gail Fine, How Nonprofits Get Really Big, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.,
Spring 2007, at 46, 53. ("Many people talk about the government getting out
of the social sector, but available data tell a different story. Not only our find-
ings, but also national data show that government funding of the nonprofit
sector is growing faster than the nation's GDP.").
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entrepreneurial, too,8 and nonprofit funders also began demanding that
nonprofits be innovative in how they generate money.9
Yet, laws limit the extent to which nonprofits may use entrepreneurial
business methods. To win exempt status, a nonprofit "must be both organ-
ized and operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes."'0 Pursuing
public benefit is an "exempt purpose"; pursuing profit usually is not.11
Then, once an organization has secured exempt status, it still faces taxes on
certain profits-those that result from trade or business regularly carried
out and not substantially related to the performance of an organization's
exempt purposes. 2 Thus, at the same time that nonprofits face pressure to
generate revenue, the legal system also creates disincentives to generate
revenue. A more capacious legal structure that allows organizations to pur-
sue public benefit and does not impose such stringent restrictions on gener-
ating revenue would help resolve this tension.
The second conundrum service organizations face in accessing capital is
that they cannot raise equity capital (i.e., capital raised by owners). A for-
profit can raise capital by attracting investors; if it succeeds, it pays some
financial return to those investors. Nonprofits cannot do this because they
cannot distribute profits. 3 As a result, the nonprofit capital market is less
disciplined than the for-profit capital market. Money does not always follow
success in the nonprofit market' 4-money often flows to new ideas rather
than proven ones.'5
8. William Foster & Jeffrey Bradach, Should Nonprofits Seek Profits?, HARV. Bus.
REV., Feb. 2005, at 92, 92.
9. Id. at 95.
10. 26 C.F.R. § 1.5o1(c)(3)-(1)(a)(1) (2007).
11. Although the doctrines growing out of this restriction are complex, in prac-
tice, this provision threatens to revoke favorable tax status for nonprofits that
engage in too much profit-making activity. For helpful discussions of this
topic, see John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemp-
tion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 495-507 (2002); and Thomas Kelley, Redis-
covering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America's Tangled Nonprofit
Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2473-83 (2005).
12. This tax is called the Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT). 26 U.S.C. § 513
(2000); 26 C.F.R. § 1.513-1 (2007).
13. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 497, 501 (1981) (discussing how nonprofits are "barred from distributing
profits, or net earnings, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as di-
rectors, officers, or members").
14. "The fact that dollars seldom follow success is one of the most vexing chal-
lenges nonprofit leaders face .... [TIhe consequence is that proven solutions
to pressing problems do not spread." Jeffrey L. Bradach, Going to Scale: The
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A new hybrid structure could help address this problem. A legal form
that would allow organizations to attract equity capital and to pursue social
aims would help recalibrate the flow of money to social organizations.16
Doing so would allow proven organizations to spend more time growing
their impact and less time fundraising. 7
Finally, grant-making foundations-key players in the nonprofit
world-face restrictions on how they can spend money to achieve their
social mission. Broadly, the law requires that grant-making foundations
invest only in nonprofit organizations."i Congress created an exception to
this rule that allows a certain amount of hybrid activity: Foundations can
make program-related investments (PRIs), which are investments, primarily
Challenge of Replicating Social Programs, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring
2003, at 19, 25.
15. Christine Letts et al., Virtuous Capital: What Foundations Can Learn from
Venture Capitalists, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 36.
16. An equity capital market for hybrids could take one of many forms. It could
rely on a system where organizations are subject to asset locks and the rates of
return to investors are capped at fairly low levels, as is the case with Commu-
nity Interest Companies in the United Kingdom. See HER MAJESTY'S CABI-
NET OFFICE, STRATEGY UNIT, PRIVATE ACTION, PUBLIC BENEFIT: A REVIEW
OF CHARITIES AND THE WIDER NOT-FOR-PROFIT SECTOR 54 (2002),
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/downloads/su/voluntary/report/download
s/strat-data.pdf. Alternatively, a hybrid capital market might include for-
profit organizations that do not cap rates of return, but simply state at the
outset that they will be pursuing social goals as well as profit. Articulating this
bifurcated commitment will indicate to investors that rates of return might be
lower than they would be in organizations pursuing only profit. Although
some potential investors would be deterred by the prospect of low returns,
some would likely still invest equity capital in these organizations. The latter
model paraphrases the concept of B Corporations, discussed infra Section
III.C.
17. Lincoln Caplan, Premium Blend: Is Google.org the Future of Philanthropy?,
SLATE, Sept. 21, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/215oo47 ("[E]ven the best
nonprofits have to spend too much time raising money. When they're ready
to multiply their contributions to society through the growth of their organi-
zations, they have to mount expensive fund drives.").
18. The tax code imposes an excise tax on a foundation and its managers if it
"invests any amount in such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any
of its exempt purposes." I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1)-(2) (2007). This language has
been interpreted to mean foundations cannot make investments that are "un-
duly risky." Richard Schmalbeck, Reconsidering Private Foundation Investment
Limitations, 58 TAX L. REV. 59, 66 (2004) ("[T]he legislative history and back-
ground behind this provision suggest that what Congress primarily meant was
simply investments that were unduly risky.").
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in the form of loans, in for-profits that help accomplish the foundation's
goals. For example, a foundation that aims to expand affordable housing
might lend money to a housing development company. If the development
project succeeds, the foundation would receive some return on its original
investment. The problem, though, is that in practice nonprofits rarely make
PRIs. 19 One reason may be that they fear the excise taxes that they would
incur by making an investment in a for-profit organization that the IRS later
deems not to further the foundation's goals.
20
A hybrid structure could address this problem by encouraging capital to
flow more readily between like-minded organizations. It would do so by
increasing nonprofits' investments in for-profit companies. Allowing capital
to flow between organizations with common interests, rather than allowing
capital to flow only between organizations with common legal structures,
would likely allow organizations to achieve their social missions more effec-
tively.
B. From the For-Profit's Perspective
The primary problem for-profits face in our binary legal system is an
inability to commit themselves to achieving social goals. For-profits wanting
to commit themselves to the pursuit of social goals face a number of legal
limitations. Courts have made clear that companies may not operate pri-
marily for the benefit of third parties.21 That is, when the goals of maximiz-
ing profit and maximizing public benefit are in tension with one another,
directors bear a legal obligation to shareholders to choose profit over public
benefit.22 In addition, the tax code creates incentives for corporations to
19. The Foundation Center reports that "only a tiny number of the many thou-
sands of foundations" in its foundation directory make PRIs. THE FOUNDA-
TION CENTER, THE PRI DIRECTORY: CHARITABLE LOANS AND OTHER PRO-
GRAM-RELATED INVESTMENTS BY FOUNDATIONS, at v (Jeffrey A. Falkenstein
ed., 2003). "In 2001, over 61,ooo active foundations paid $30.5 billion in
grants," and PRIs accounted for only 232.9 million dollars of foundation dis-
bursements-or less than 1%. Id. at v-vi.
20. THOMAS J. BILLITTERI, ASPEN INSTITUTE, NONPROFIT SECTOR RESEARCH
FUND, MIXING MISSION AND BUSINESS: DOES SOCIAL ENTERPRISE NEED A
NEW LEGAL APPROACH? 5-6 (2007), available at www.nonprofitresearch.org/
usrdoc/NewLegalFormsReportFINAL.pdf.
21. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 17o N.W. 668, 683 (Mich. 1919) (finding invalid
Henry Ford's explanation for why he did not distribute larger dividends to his
shareholders-that his ambition was "to employ still more men, to spread the
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them
build up their lives and their homes").
22. "Shareholder wealth maximization long has been the fundamental norm
which guides U.S. corporate decisionmakers." Stephen M. Bainbridge, In De-
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limit their charitable contributions.23 As a result of these constraints, for-
profits struggle to remain committed to a social mission.
A new hybrid structure could address this problem. Creating a legal
form that allows simultaneous pursuit of profit and mission would give
socially inclined for-profits the opportunity to institutionalize their com-
mitments to goals beyond profit. This, in turn, would allow organizations to
chart a stable, sustained approach to-and therefore to work more effec-
tively toward-those social goals.
A second, related, problem for-profits face is that they cannot signal
their social commitments clearly. They may promote themselves as socially
conscious, yet there is no standardized way to certify companies' assertions
or to compare practices across companies. Hence, the consumer rarely
knows how to weigh a company's claims. A new type of organization that
clearly denotes social responsibility by, for example, creating a new, visible,
formal designation, would allow businesses to signal their commitments
more effectively. Adding this level of clarity would help businesses brand
themselves, which would allow them to cash in on their good deeds more
efficiently.
II. THE WAY FORWARD (FOR Now)
Commentators have championed three approaches to promoting hy-
brid activity: (a) creating new corporate forms, (b) changing tax laws, and
(c) working within current laws. I briefly summarize and assess each pro-
posal below. Ultimately, I find the last option holds considerable promise
for organizations in the immediate future.
A. Creating New Corporate Forms
State legislatures have recently attempted to create two new corporate
forms. Minnesota and Hawaii proposed almost identical legislation to create
"Socially Responsible Corporations" (SRCs). Organizations with this desig-
nation would commit themselves to maximizing both shareholders' profits
and social impact, and directors would bear an obligation not only to
maximize profit but also to pursue "public benefit."24 A publicly traded
fense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor
Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993).
23. Whereas an individual may deduct a charitable gift up to either 30% or 50%
of his taxpayer contribution base, a corporation may deduct gifts only up to
lo% of its taxable income. 26 U.S.C. § 17o(b)(1)(A)-(B), (b)(2) (2000).
24. Public benefit is defined as "general public well-being of present and future
generations including, but not limited to, the economy, natural environment,
public health, public safety, human rights, educational and other human de-
velopmental opportunities, and the general well-being of the local, state, na-
tional, or world community." See S.F. No. 3786, ch. 3o4A, § 2(2), 84th Legis.
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corporation would have to affirm its commitment to "public benefit" by
filing a "public interest report" along with its annual financial report. In
addition, SRC boards would have to include directors who represent both
the employees' interests and the public interest. 25 The Minnesota legislation
did not propose to give SRCs favorable tax treatment; instead, that legisla-
tion simply proposed to allow SRCs to pursue something other than short-
term profit-maximization. Hawaii, however, was poised to grant SRCs tax
breaks. It did not flesh out the details, but the legislation said that a "com-
pany incorporated as a responsible business corporation under this chapter
shall be exempt from - per cent of all corporate taxes." 26 Critics took aim
at this provision.27 Ultimately, neither state passed the legislation, but Min-
nesota is considering similar legislation this session.28
Such legislation would offer several benefits. It would allow organiza-
tions to make explicit commitments to both profit and social mission simul-
taneously. Since SRCs would technically operate as a new type of for-profit
organization, they could attract investors and draw on the for-profit capital
markets to accomplish their social mission. In addition, the SRC designa-
tion would build a clear brand that would give organizations a reliable way
to broadcast their social commitments to consumers. The primary draw-
back of this approach to fostering hybrid organizations is that passing the
legislation will likely consume significant time and money. Strident opposi-
Sess. (Minn. 20o6), available at http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/ bin/
bldbill.php?bill=S3786.o.html&session=ls84; see also H.B. 3118, § 2, 23d Leg.
(Haw. 2oo6), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sitel/archives/2oo6/
getstatus.asp?query=HB3118&showstatus=on&showtext=on&showcommrpt=
on&currpage=l.
25. At least one-fifth of directors must be nominated and elected by the corpora-
tion's employees and charged with advocating for those employees. For Min-
nesota, see supra note 24, at § 3o4A.o6.b; for Hawaii, see supra note 24, at §
6(b). At least one-fifth of directors "must represent and advocate for the pub-
lic interest." Existing board members are to elect these members "after seek-
ing input from persons or groups representing the public interest." For Min-
nesota, see S.F. No. 3786, supra note 24, § 6.b.; for Hawaii, see H.B. 3118 supra
note 24, at § 6(c).
26. See H.B. 3118, supra note 24, § 1O.
27. Editorial, "Responsible" Firms Don't Merit New Prize, HONOLULU ADVER-
TISER, Mar. 29, 2006, at 14A ("The proposal is, at best, silly and unproductive,
and at worst, a loophole through which more business-paid tax revenue could
leak needlessly.").
28. H.F. No. 404, 85th Leg. (Minn. 2007-2oo8), available at http://www.revisor.
leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=Ho4o4.o.html&session=ls85.
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tion to this legislation29 and multiple failed attempts to pass it suggest that
creating the SRC designation will be no small task.
The North Carolina legislature is trying to create a different kind of cor-
porate form: low-profit, limited liability companies (L3Cs). 3' This designa-
tion would be available to LLCs that generate modest profit while carrying
on business activities with a charitable purpose. The criteria for L3C status, a
status that offers no tax benefit, closely track the characteristics for-profits
must possess in order to be eligible to receive a PRI.3" Thus, an L3C designa-
tion would act as a pre-approval for a PRI. Pre-approval is meant to reas-
sure foundations that they may give PRIs to L3Cs without risking punish-
ment for making "jeopardizing investments." North Carolina did not enact
this legislation.
The North Carolina legislation would have one clear benefit: "facili-
tat[ing] the flow of philanthropic capital to economic development activi-
ties such as creating jobs in economically depressed areas."32 Although L3Cs
show promise, they would accomplish fairly limited objectives. First, they
serve a narrow charitable purpose at this point: job creation in distressed
industries. Second, they create a limited benefit: L3Cs would affect the flow
of a relatively small amount of capital, since they affect only the flow of PRIs
and, as discussed above, PRIs comprise a relatively small amount of founda-
tion grants.33 For this amount to rise to a level of significance, PRIs would
have to increase dramatically.
Taken together, these legislative proposals would go a long way toward
fostering hybrid activity. But there are reasons hybrid enthusiasts may not
want to wait for such legislation before pursuing further hybrid activity.
Each piece of legislation addresses only some of the constraints on organiza-
29. See, e.g., Jerry Coffee, It's the Worst Business Law Ever, MIDWEEK.COM, Apr.
12, 2006, available at http://www.midweek.com/content/columns/coffeebreak
_article/its the worst business law ever/.
30. S.B. 91, General Assemb., Sess. 2007, pt. 3 (N.C. 2007), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/2oo7/Bills/Senate/PDF/S91v5.pdf; H.B. 39, Gen-
eral Assemb., Sess. 2007, pt. 3 (N.C. 2007), available at http://www.ncleg.
net/sessions/2007/bills/house/PDF/H39v'.pdf.
31. The L3C designation would be limited to business activities that significantly
further a charitable or educational purpose, do not have a significant goal of
producing income or capital appreciation, and do not accomplish political or
legislative purposes. S.B. 91, General Assemb., Sess. 2007, pt. 3 (N.C. 2007),
available at http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/PDF/S91v5.pdf.,
at § 3.1.
32. Council on Foundations., 2007 Agenda for Philanthropic Partnership,
http://www.cof.org/Action/content.cfm?ItemNumber=9783&navltemNumbe
r=2320#13c (last visited Dec. 13, 2007).
33. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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tions. SRC legislation, for example, does not help nonprofit money flow
across the boundary to for-profits; L3C legislation neither helps mission-
based organizations raise money nor allows profit-based organizations to
spend money and resources on social goals. To develop a comprehensive
solution to the current constraints on organizations, then, states must pass
both types of legislation. Given that no state has managed to pass either SRC
or L3C legislation so far, it is not clear when a state will pass both. Thus,
hybrid enthusiasts would be best served by a solution that allows for more
immediate pursuit of all types of hybrid activity.
B. Changing Tax Laws
One pair of academics proposes changing tax laws to give for-profits tax
breaks for their charitable activities.34 Anup Malani and Eric Posner note
that nonprofits do not pay corporate income taxes, and their donors may
deduct donations from their income for personal income tax purposes. If a
for-profit conducts charitable work, though, it must pay corporate income
taxes on its profits and donors may not deduct donations. Malani and Pos-
ner argue that these asymmetric benefits create structural incentives to sup-
port charitable activities carried out by the formal nonprofit sector. This
incentive structure creates inefficiencies: The current coupling of tax treat-
ment with nonprofit form might "discourage[] talented altruists from estab-
lishing charitable enterprises."35 In addition, the current coupling may even
give a competitive advantage to inefficient producers in the nonprofit sec-
tor. Assume, for example, that A and B produce the same thing as one an-
other and B has higher production costs. If B opts for nonprofit status, he
will get certain tax breaks. Those tax breaks might allow B offer his product
at a price lower than A's price. If so, then inefficient B will take business
away from efficient A.36
Posner and Malani argue for symmetry between for-profit and non-
profit tax systems. Just as nonprofits are treated like for-profits when they
engage in commercial ventures, for-profits should be treated like nonprofits
when they engage in charitable ventures.37
If this proposal were adopted, it presumably would exempt for-profits
from corporate income taxes on their charitable activities and would make
donations to these charitable activities tax-deductible. Decreasing the cost of
engaging in charitable activities by giving these tax breaks should create
34. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities 17-18 (Univ.
of Chi. John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 304,
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstractid=928976.
35. Id. at 17.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2.
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incentives for for-profits to engage in more charitable activities. Nonethe-
less, for-profit directors would still face legal obligations to maximize short-
term profit. These obligations would limit the extent to which directors
could engage in this newly incentivized charitable activity.
Regardless of the extent to which for-profits would be able to take ad-
vantage of this new incentive, this proposal would likely meet stiff, perhaps
insurmountable, opposition. Critics have leveled two criticisms at tax-
exemptions for nonprofits: First, these exemptions potentially erode the tax
base by diminishing the total tax revenues government collects from busi-
ness; second, they threaten to permit the inefficiencies discussed above."
The prospect of expanding tax exemptions to include for-profits would
likely meet similar criticism. Furthermore, expanding tax exemptions for
for-profits would likely result in abuse and exploitation of those exemp-
tions. Companies that do not intend to accomplish any social goals, for
instance, might try to use these new exemptions as tax shelters for their for-
profit operations. 9
C. Reinterpreting and Working Within Current Laws
The most promising schemes for exploring hybrid organizations in the
immediate future are those that propose to reinterpret and work within
current laws. These schemes accomplish most of the same goals the more
ambitious reforms seek, but they do not involve the massive investment of
resources and time necessary to change the laws.
The first approach creates a new corporate designation, but it does so
within the current laws. Jay Coen Gilbert, the for-profit entrepreneur who
founded Andi, a basketball apparel company, is spearheading an effort to
create For-Benefit Corporations (also called "B corporations"). B corpora-
tions incorporate under states' current corporate statutes and are subject to
private-sector tax laws. They differ from traditional corporations (e.g., S
corporations, C corporations), though, in that they spell out their social
commitments in their corporate governing documents for all potential in-
vestors to see.
38. Much of the literature on UBIT discusses these two types of concerns. See,
e.g., Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organi-
zations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L. J. 299, 316-30 (1976); Charles
T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced Distortions in the Voluntary Sector, 39 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 663, 677-8o (1988-1989); Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and
the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605 (1989); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1017, 1017-19, 1025-30 (1982).
39. Supporters of increasing exemptions might devise safeguards to limit such
exploitation. Discussion of such safeguards, however, is not within the scope
of this Comment.
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To qualify as a B corporation, a company must first commit itself to a
governance structure that reflects a broad set of stakeholders.4 ' This ensures
that a B corporation aims not only to maximize profits for shareholders but
also to pursue the interests of its employees and, more broadly, of the com-
munities and environments in which it operates. Second, a B corporation
has to commit to meeting a set of social and environmental performance
standards." B Lab, a nonprofit organization, functions as an impartial
third-party that certifies and rates B corporations on how well they actually
meet these standards.
This approach to hybrid activity accomplishes a lot. It allows an organi-
zation to commit itself to maximizing both profit and social impact. These
organizations would be able to tap into both the for-profit capital market
and the nonprofit capital market (namely, by receiving PRIs). The designa-
tion as a B corporation would create an identifiable brand for socially re-
sponsible companies, and the rating system would preserve the integrity of
that brand by giving investors transparency into the organizations' prac-
tices. This scheme accomplishes all of this without relying on legislative
victories.
Over twenty companies have already opted for this designation. 2 The
first, Upstream 21, a holding company in Oregon, rewrote its Articles of
Incorporation to commit itself to pursuing the "best interests" of the com-
pany which it defined to include:
[D]ue consideration of: the Company's and its subsidiaries' social,
legal and economic effects on their employees, customers and sup-
pliers and on the communities and geographic areas in which the
company and its subsidiaries operate; the long-term as well as
short-term interests of the Company and its shareholders; and the
Company's and its subsidiaries' effects on the environment. 3
Although these terms take a big step toward creating a genuine hybrid
organization under current laws, it remains to be seen whether courts would
uphold such Articles of Incorporation as valid. The case law against such
commitments applies only to for-profits that have not spelled out in their
Articles of Incorporation any commitments beyond profit maximization.
No law prevents companies from articulating social commitments in their
Articles of Incorporation and pursuing those social commitments in addi-
40. B Corporation, About B, http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last visited
Dec. 13, 2007).
41. Id.
42. B Corporation, B Community, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/
(last visited Dec. 13, 2007).
43. Restated Articles of Incorporation of Upstream 21 Corporation (undated) (on
file with author).
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tion to pursuing profit. The law simply has established profit-maximization
as a default rule. The B corporation approach is essentially allowing a com-
pany and its investors to contract around that rule. Only thirty-one states
have expressly permitted companies to add these types of provisions to their
Articles of Incorporation. 4 No court has yet determined whether these pro-
visions are legally binding.45
Opponents of this idea might claim that these broad commitments set
such wide parameters for directors that these terms effectively free directors
from any legal obligations. In turn, this might undermine investor confi-
dence in directors. In practice, the market will determine whether this is a
valid concern. That is, if people feel uncomfortable with broad social com-
mitments then they will not invest in B corporations and the corporations
will fail. A second criticism is that companies will exploit the new legal form.
B corporations do not receive any tax breaks, but they do benefit from the
millions of dollars B Lab spends each year promoting B corporations. Com-
panies might try to freeride on this marketing by incorporating as a B cor-
poration and not meeting their stated social commitments. Coen Gilbert
anticipated this problem, though. B Lab's impartial certification of B corpo-
rations' practices makes transparent the companies' practices and reveals
those companies that are attempting to exploit the designation.
The second proposal for exploring hybrid activity within the current le-
gal system aims to increase foundations' use of PRIs. To do so, Marcus
Owens, former head of the Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations
Division, proposes drawing brighter lines to guide foundations toward
companies that would be appropriate PRI recipients. We need not create a
new corporate form like L3Cs in order to draw these bright lines, though.
Instead, Owens suggests that the IRS could simply identify a number of for-
profit entities that accomplish what it considers to be charitable goals. The
IRS could then issue a roster of these organizations doing PRI-worthy
work.46
Publishing this roster would facilitate PRIs in two ways. It would re-
move the risk of punishment for foundations granting loans to non-PRI-
worthy companies. In addition, it would help foundations, especially small
ones, learn which companies are doing work that aligns with the founda-
tions' missions.47 By reducing the risks involved in making PRIs this plan
44. Hannah Clark, A New Kind of Company: B Corporations Worry About Stake-
holders, Not Just Shareholders, INC.MAG, July 2007, at 23, 24, available at
http://www.bcorporation.net/blog/IncMagazine.pdf.
45. Id.
46. See THOMAS J. BILLITTERI, supra note 20, at io-ii (summarizing Owens's
proposal of this plan to an Aspen Institute working group).
47. See id.
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would likely increase the existing underused mechanism for foundations to
invest in for-profits.
Each of these proposals charts a complementary course for development
of hybrid structures. B Corporations address many of the problems our
binary legal structure creates for both service-oriented nonprofits and for-
profits. Owens's idea addresses the central problem foundations face. To-
gether, these proposals present fairly comprehensive solutions to the current
restrictions on hybrid activity, and they allow further exploration of hybrid
organizations to proceed immediately and without waiting to change any
laws.
CONCLUSION
We have seen a recent flurry of interest in hybrid social organizations
that try to operate in the legal space between for-profits and nonprofits.
These types of organizations appear to have potential to address some of the
problems for-profits and nonprofits face when they try to address social
problems. As such, there are compelling reasons to continue exploring how
the laws can foster such hybrid structures. After assessing current proposals
to do so, the best road forward is to work first within existing laws, while
continuing efforts to change the laws comprehensively.
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